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Abstract: 
This paper proposes to show that the return of mercenaries is due largely to the shift of infantry 
warfare from large pitched battles to small skirmishes. This research analyses the historic 
reasons for employment of mercenary companies, including their self-sufficiency, high level of 
combat experience and specialization in different fields of combat. The era of the mercenary of 
antiquity sees its end with the rise of the musket. It is this invention which causes drastic change 
in the dynamics of the battlefield, rendering mercenary companies obsolete. However, the world 
has seen a massive resurgence of private military companies, with the dynamics of warfare once 
again turning to a battlefield requiring individuals who possess the same characteristics of 
mercenaries past. Addressing this past and comparing it to the present, we see that mercenaries 
are not a new phenomenon, no matter what label is applied, and that mercenaries will continue 
to remain a consistent part of warfare until technology once again renders them obsolete. 
Introduction 
Though retaining a remarkable technical uniformity through history, the mercenary 
tradition systematically perpetuated itself, to the point of threatening governmental monopoly on 
violence. The private soldier is not a newcomer to warfare, and under the name of “mercenary,” 
the first account of the profession was in the employ of King Shulgri of Ur 2094 BCEi.  This 
paper, which will follow the evolution of mercenary forces is divided into sections as follows: 
first, terminology and the dynamics of warfare will be discussed in order to better illustrate the 
similarities between PMSCs (Private Military and Security Companies) and the mercenaries of 
the past. The paper will then trace the Greek mercenary trade and its development, followed by 
the Free Companies of the 11th-16th century Europe and the impact of their systemization in 
different countries. This process will aid the reader in understanding the chronological 
development of the mercenary profession from individual soldiers for hire to registered corporate 
military entities. Finally, the paper will explore the decline of the mercenary profession through 
the widespread implementation of firearms in militaries, as well as the return of the mercenary in 
the 20th century as a military profession. As P.W. Singer, a political scientist, writes: 
“PMFs (Private Military Firms) are structured as firms and operate as businesses first and 
foremost. As business entities, they are often linked through complex financial ties to 
other firms, both within and outside their industry. In fact, many of the most active 
PMFs, such as Armorgroup or Vinnell, are openly part of broader multinational 
corporations”ii.  
The PMSC economic boom, which occurred after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 
2001, began as a revamping of the military utilising instruction and training offered by PMSCs, 
who served in  non-combat roleiii. While this drastic increase in mercenary activity exceeded the 
projections of some analyses examining the increase of PMSCs in the global market, it did not 
altogether contradict them; there was an expectation of their eventual increase, which had 
already been set in motioniv. Since then, PMSCs have become major actors in the military 
market, offering high wages to individuals with a wide range of specialized skill setsv, so that in 
some cases Special Forces find themselves in direct competition with these companies through 
the “poaching” of their recruitsvi.  
Since PMSC’s are private enterprises, individuals who are employed by these firms may 
work in concert with military forces, but they are not under their direct control. This lack of 
direct control has in the past led to acts ranging from the sacking of cities to their complete 
seizure, such as the sacking of Rome in 1527, or the mercenary war of Carthage in the 3rd 
century B.C. This creates a future cause for alarm, since the power of these highly trained 
companies might strip governments of their control over the armed forces they employ. 
Literature Review 
 To begin, this section will present some clarification regarding the debate about the 
lineage of the PMSC industry from the mercenary profession. Once the continuity of the 
profession has been established, the general dynamics of warfare up to the 18th century will be 
illustrated in three sections, in order to contextualize the skill required of these private actors. It 
can be observed that the privatized and specialized nature of military and security companies, as 
well as their diverse breadth of employers, ties their lineage to the mercenary tradition as private 
actors on the battlefield. In addition, the skills that were needed in pre-firearm combat were 
demanding, requiring much training and experience. Mercenaries provided this skill and 
experience without the time required for a commander to train their own troops. 
Terminology: PMSC VS Mercenary 
 Private Military and Security Companies operate under a multitude of names. This 
includes Private Military Firms (PMF), Private Security Companies (PSC), Private Military 
Companies (PMC) and Private Military and Security Firms (PMSF). 
The United Nations has criminalized mercenaries, creating incentive for PMSCs to 
disassociate themselves with the label, hence the more modern term utilized, “contractors”. 
However, the label “contractor” itself draws the image of a private entity working for a limited 
period, with a financial incentive, thereby once again eliciting and recalling the mercenary 
function. 
 There has been much debate regarding the definition of PMSC (or any of the other above 
titles) being the same as mercenary in profession, with some academics seeing them as an 
evolution of the mercenary.vii viii Others state that a PMSC is not connected to mercenaries 
because of the formal, highly corporatized nature which is stressed by these companies, causing 
them to disassociate themselves from rag-tag bands of soldiers for hire.ix x Interestingly, a similar 
corporate stance can be seen in the development of the Condottieri in Italy of the Renaissance; 
they maintained permanent organizationsxi and had multiple employees who worked 
administrative roles, such as notaries and attorneys. This arrangement more closely resembles a 
corporate-like structure (to the extent possible in that time) rather than a ragged mercenary 
band.xii We cannot completely disassociate PMSCs from the mercenary trade, especially when 
“many PMF employees have been mercenaries both before and after their employ, [although] 
their processes, relationships, and impacts within local conflicts were completely different”.xiii 
Nonetheless, there is a general consensus that the companies themselves are not mercenary 
enterprises; therefore, the proclivities of their employees, outside of their current contract, are not 
indicative of the current nature of their employment.  
Combined with this popular stance, the nature of the U.N. definition of mercenary means 
that any individual working under the label of Private Military and Security Company can simply 
call himself/herself a Private Military and Security Contractor, employed by said company and 
therefore protected from the infamous mercenary label. However, it should be pointed out that 
there are still independent private actors who function directly as mercenaries, without an 
alternative to adopt an alternative label. Thus, PMSCs have not completely replaced the 
mercenary figure from warfare. Rather, it can be observed, based on the privatized nature of 
these military and security companies and their diverse breadth of employers, that these PMSCs 
owe their lineage to the mercenary tradition as private actors in otherwise state-monopolized 
warfare; they have expanded the services they offer to multiple sectors of the military industry. 
 Other analysts are more than happy to make no distinction between private entities and 
militaries that are hired out to fight for other nations, such as the Swiss cantons (districts) hiring 
out their militias to the French, Spanish, English, and Dutch in the 1700s, or the Hessians hired 
out by German territories to the British to fight in the American Revolution. However, this is a 
faulty assumption, lacking the distinction afforded to PMSCs and mercenaries today. These 
forces of Swiss and German troops were hired out directly under the sanction of their sovereign 
states as previously mentioned, and thus are not deserving of the mercenary status ascribed to 
them. The debate seems to be less about the fact that mercenaries are private actors with their 
own authority of force and PMSCs are also private entities with authority of force, but that 
PMSCs also provide such services as security consulting, training, and logistics, in addition to 
force. The end result is simply that PMSCs differentiate their services in order to create a new 
label for the mercenary actor, and therefore do not wish to be associated with the stigma (or 
illegality) of the “mercenary” profession.   
The Dynamics of Warfare 
 In order to explain the temporal continuity of the profession, from mercenary to PMSCs, 
it is necessary to explain the historical appeal that mercenary forces held throughout history. 
Hand to hand combat on the battlefield required extensive drilling and experience, something 
which was very costly and time consuming if a would-be military commander wished to raise his 
or her own army. A much simpler and more cost-effective way to create an efficient fighting-
force involved hiring mercenaries, as they were often combat experienced and usually had a 
specialization in select armaments, such as pikes or crossbows. Equally, however, once 
technology advanced to the point whereby firearms (starting with the musket) replaced all other 
infantry armaments, the specialized actor was no longer needed, and the mercenary found 
himself obsolete. Thus, the necessity of private actors is directly proportional to the level of 
specialized skill needed in an armed conflict.  
Pre-Musket: Pre-1700 
 Prior to the adoption of firearms, violence was not as simple as pulling a trigger. Warfare 
went through multiple phases and indeed cycled on itself with cavalry and missile troops, such as 
archers and slingers, each taking a role in the spotlight and with the infantry forever providing 
the backbone of every assaultxiv. These roles required both constant drilling, and no small 
amount of skill. A highly disciplined and skilled group could confront a poorly trained group 
many times its numberxv. Fighting throughout the Grecian age was conducted in a three foot 
interval; that is to say, soldiers were trained to maintain a three foot distance from each other, 
providing adequate space to thrust, slash and hack at their opponentsxvi. What this combat-
structure meant was that the battlefield was dominated by soldiers who, once committed, were 
required to fight under their own initiative, gradually grinding down the opposition in one-on-
one combat: in other words, a duel with the individual directly in front of you. This type of 
combat required individuals to be in good physical condition, skilled, motivated, and disciplined. 
Killing an opponent demanded physical strength and the endurance to continue the assault for 
long periods of time. Skill was needed to survive and kill efficiently; violence was not as simple 
as pointing and pulling a trigger and thus required a higher level of self-control and stamina. For 
instance, the Greeks and the Romans both fought in the phalanx, a tight block formation of 
individuals who guarded each other with their shields. This required strict discipline in order to 
achieve a unified speed by which the phalanx moved, lest the cohesion break. The Romans 
would eventually move this towards individual prowess, with soldiers spreading further apart, 
quite literally turning the battle into multiple duelsxvii. As it was in 400 BC, so it was in 1600 
AD: the infantry dominated the battlefield, backed up by cavalry and missile troops, many of 
which were highly specialized and required extensive training. 
Training: Three Examples 
        Training itself was aimed at conditioning an individual who was competent with a sword 
and shield. The person would need to learn the basic mechanisms of different strokes, as well as 
proper application of parrying or feinting in order to gain an advantage over their opponent. 
Furthermore, they would be instructed how to properly handle a shield: where to stand behind it, 
how to properly angle it for different incoming blows, and how to strike while still maintaining a 
defensive posture. This would include line drills, as a unit would need to achieve a uniform 
defensive posture of overlapping shields to maintain a solid line in the face of assault.   
        An even more drastic example was that of the longbow men. The famous English 
longbow men required years of training simply in order to achieve full draw of the 6-foot long 
bow (boys would begin instruction by age seven)xviii. Archers’ skeletons of the period have been 
found with deformed left arm and shoulder bones, as well as twisted vertebrae, as a result of 
repeatedly drawing the bowstring. This was a highly specialized skill and as such saw usage 
throughout the 1300s-1400s. English longbow men were highly sought for by other countries for 
mercenary work. The famous ``White Company`` of John Hawkwood, which operated inside 
Italy in the fifteenth century, possessed a contingent of English longbow men, and at least one 
contract Hawkwood accepted specified that the archers in his company be Englishxix to 
strengthen their force.   
 This specialized training, combined with often sizable amounts of experience, were what 
made mercenaries all the more marketable to kingdoms looking for soldiers. While hiring these 
“specialists” could be costly, it was still much more profitable and time-efficient to employ these 
individuals, who often came with their own equipment (in order to join a landsknecht regiment, 
for instance, an individual had to at least supply their own pikexx), as opposed to recruiting, 
equipping, feeding and training an entire army from the general population.  Since skill and 
experience were equal to, if not more important, than numbers in combat, a highly trained and 
equipped mercenary force had a very strong appeal to most rulers. In fact, this became such a 
perpetuated practice that it continued to grow and diversify until the rise of standardized armies.  
The Adoption of Firearms: 1400s-1700 
 Initially, the adoption of firearms by militaries did not radically change the way wars 
were conducted. For over a century, they simply supplanted the role of the bow, and regiments of 
pikes augmented by cavalry and cannon continued to wage war, with the all-important pike 
regiments gradually grinding down their oppositionxxi. By 1700, however, the pike had been 
completely eliminated, with the musket now being the prime weapon of choice for the infantry. 
This black-powdered rifle was an instrument that required raw memorization more than a 
specific skill to use; the individual had to complete over a dozen movements to load, aim, and 
fire the weapon, all while under incoming enemy fire and following the orders of his officerxxii. It 
was through this new method of warfare that the average soldier was no longer required to be a 
highly-experienced, calculating individual who could be set loose with his comrades onto the 
battlefield. Rather, he became a piece of machinery made to fulfill a function dictated by his 
officers’ strict commands. The individual simply required strict drilling to perform this task, and 
less time was required to train an individual to an acceptable level of proficiencyxxiii. The speed 
with which soldiers could be trained made it so that conscription gradually became preferable to 
hiring outside forces, and armies began to swell in size. The mercenaries that were hired at this 
point were almost entirely those purchased from one country by another rather than independent 
actors.  
 Despite this, the mercenary tradition, established by such individuals as the Greeks and 
Swiss, had developed a historic imprint of the private actor as the provider of high-specialization 
and short-term employ. This imprint would withstand the dynamic shift of warfare, which still 
found these characteristics to be an ever valuable asset. 
 
The Greek Mercenary 
The Greek mercenary tradition is particularly important because of their systemization of 
the mercenary forces under their employ. The Greek mercenary trade (500 B.C. to around 100 
B.C.) presented a specialized business in arms, laying the systemized and contractual 
groundwork for the mercenary tradition. Different regions of Greece are documented as being 
specialized in certain weapon types, thus providing us with an aspect of cultural diversity. 
Furthermore, the documentation of this regional specialization and employment shows that the 
Greek mercenaries were sought out to the point that states such as Carthage built their armies and 
selected fighters almost entirely from the mercenary pool. 
The specialization of particular groups shows us a range of set skills that were marketed 
as needed. For instance, the Cretans were proficient in archery, and the Rhodians were skilled 
slingers.xxiv Also, the Arcadian people seem to have supplied the bulk of mercenary services 
across Greece and beyond; both Alexander the Great and Xerxes of Persia had Greek hoplites—
heavy infantry—in their armies.xxv xxvi These examples suggest that the Greeks already showed 
proficiency in this form of soldiering; otherwise their mercenary forces would have eventually 
been absorbed into other native units, such as the Macedonian pike regiments, which also 
marched for Alexander.xxvii  
 Some employers who used mercenaries to maintain quasi-standing armies offered quite 
constant and defined contracts—a surviving example being that of Eumenes I of Pergamum, 
whose 260 B.C. contract included:  
1. A fixed price for wine and wheat at the commissary. 
2. A campaign year of ten months, the final two months being unpaid. 
3. Special tax dispensation. 
4. Welfare benefits for soldiers unable to find employment on the completion of a contract, and 
provision made for the orphans of men killed on service.xxviii 
The Greek mercenary boom truly systemized the mercenary trade, actively stipulating 
such details as the rate of pay, length of service and campaigning year.xxix Coinage was largely 
implemented in Greece by 505 BC for mercenaries’ wages, and even upon the cessation of coin 
use in many Greek cities, the ones which continued to employ large contingents of mercenaries 
continued to produce large quantities of gold and silver coins.xxx This encouraged economic 
growth in a more modern sense. It is, however, important to note that Egypt already long had a 
complex and sophisticated system of financial transactions for mercenaries without coinagexxxi, 
and Carthage also did not implement coinage until the end of the fifth century BC. Even then, 
they only employed coinage that was struck in Sicily, where a large portion of its mercenary 
contingents were hired.xxxii The Greek mercenary boom also had a further social phenomenon 
element to it, as mercenaries came to be acceptable in Greek society.xxxiii This is particularly of 
note since we see the recurrence of this fact with the Italian renaissance and arguably yet again 
with the PMC boom of the 21st century. The popularity of mercenary forces and their growing 
power, however, created the potential for a large-scale mutiny. This danger can be seen as 
directly proportional to the reliance and control of a governing body on hired forces.  
 Carthage—arguably the wealthiest city of its time—was able to afford an almost entirely 
mercenary army, picking and choosing exactly who to hire. In one instance the Carthaginians are 
recorded hiring a Spartan mercenary in 256 –255 BC specifically to train their armiesxxxiv ; he 
was essentially an ancient private military consultant. However, their reliance on mercenary 
forces led them to be vulnerable in the face of a power they couldn’t stop. A prime example 
would be the Carthaginian “Mercenary War”, in which mercenaries in the employ of Carthage, 
returning to the city in the wake of the First Punic War, found that the city elders would not pay 
the soldiers their back wages.xxxv xxxvi In protest, the mercenaries marched on Carthage, joined by 
some seventy thousand incensed Libyan peasants, thus starting the war.xxxvii xxxviii In the end, it 
took Carthage had to use what little wealth remained in order to employ yet more mercenaries to 
quash the first contingent.  
 While the mutiny of forces is not something exclusive to mercenaries, this level of 
rebellion and seeking to extract payment is not the same as a military coup—an action more 
commonly associated with national militaries. The Carthage Mercenary War illustrates the 
damage that mercenaries can wreak on their employer if they feel cheated on pay or are 
otherwise disgruntled. While Carthage managed to eventually overcome the mercenary revolt, a 
nation that puts all of its military resources into hiring private actors in a modern setting would 
be equally, if not more, hard pressed to repeat this victory. 
 This image of mercenaries operating under their own initiative would continue in the 13th 
century, when the European Free Companies would act of their own accord to seek employment, 
banding together and moving from country to country offering their services to the highest 
bidder. 
The Free Companies of Europe 
 The European mercenary boom of the 13th century provides an example of military 
downsizing expanding the pool for mercenary recruitment, thus illustrating the effect of warfare 
conducted by nearly-pure mercenary armies, as it was the case of the Italian-city states. Also, an 
interesting example is that of Switzerland, in which one of its main exports was mercenaries. 
The Free Companies (also known as Great Companies or Free Lancers) began to gain 
prominence throughout Europe in the 13th centuries and were influenced heavily by the 
development of mercenary warfare throughout the medieval ages. The Companies developed 
roughly in parallel with the Condottieri, who became famous throughout Europe as Italian 
mercenary army recruiters.  Comprised of men from a multitude of countries, often former men-
at-arms who found themselves out of work once warfare in their native lands ended, the Free 
Companies functioned as private armies that owed allegiance to no specific government. These 
armies had their own equipment and were available to any noble offering enough coin to employ 
them, creating armies comprised of multiple companies working in unison. The rise of the Free 
Companies has often been linked directly to the end of the first phase (1339-1360) of the 
Hundred Years War (1339-1453), during which both the English and French downsized their 
armies with the signing of the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360.xxxix This downsizing included veteran 
foot soldiers, as well as captains and other battlefield commanders who had been fighting for the 
English and French nobility. While the vast majority complied with the order to return to their 
peacetime occupations, many did not.xl These bands of men operated completely outside of any 
military or government authority, and would hire themselves out to whoever was willing to pay 
for their services. The Free Companies developed a fearsome reputation for looting and 
savagery. In one notable case, the Grand Catalan Company turned on its employer in order to 
create the Duchy of Athens, transforming a successful military company into a successful 
political entity.xli The Free Companies and their other mercenary cousins were often combat 
veterans, and offered specialized forms of combat not seen in militia units utilized by military 
commanders for basic line infantry. Some notable examples included the Swiss Pike Companies, 
the German Landsknecht, and the Italian Condottieri.  
These notable examples illustrate the different approaches mercenaries took to making 
themselves an important asset to military commanders. They also provide examples of the 
further systemization and industrialization of private warfare, making mercenary employment 
the all-important staple of the military market.  
The Swiss Pike Companies  
 The Swiss Pike companies illustrate the controlling power of a nation that utilized its 
potential employment pool to create a powerful fighting force capable of offering its services in 
other wars, while retaining the loyalty of its mercenary base.  
Switzerland during the 13–16th centuries is often compared to Greece in terms of its 
mercenary boom; the Swiss were the preferred mercenary forces for many armies, and the 
mercenary trade became a national hallmark.xlii However, the Swiss companies were often hired 
out en masse by their cantons (Swiss districts) to fight as mercenaries, thus gaining state 
approval for citizens who chose this type of employment, rather than developing independent 
mercenary bands.xliii xliv This made the Swiss very attractive to other nations due to their already 
trained and armed nature. Furthermore, it has been suggested that this was done so that 
Switzerland would be able to avoid directly entering warfare, as it had a large element of its 
population already very experienced in warfare.xlv Specifically, the Swiss were infamous for 
their tactics involving the pike. 
 The pike is by definition an exceptionally long spear (roughly 14–18 feet long) which 
levelled out the playing field of battle for infantry against cavalry. Prior to development of the 
pike, heavy cavalry had dominated the battlefield as the shock offensive force. However, the 
Swiss `Push of Pike` style of warfare rapidly seized the imagination of military tacticians and 
swayed the status quo away from heavy cavalry and towards an infantry-heavy battlefield. The 
Swiss initially supplied a specialized type of troops that different rulers rushed to obtain, 
including French, Italian and Hungarian generals. The ‘pike men’ comprised a shock unit, which 
utilized thick columns of soldiers and effectively steamrolled its opponents with sheer brute 
force, or “push-of-pike” tactics.xlvi This made them unique, as the Swiss somewhat minimized 
their use of crossbows, handguns and artillery, preferring to maintain very strong pike and 
halberd squares. xlvii xlviii        
 The Swiss would see their status as specialized offensive troops end with a bitter defeat at 
the Battle of Bicocca in 1522, against a combined force of Spanish Tericos and German 
Landsknecht mercenaries that used fortifications and handguns to inflict heavy casualties.xlix l 
This resulted in the Swiss beginning to adopt the formations and tactics of other units on the 
field, maintaining a strong ranged weapon group as well as artillery. Since their tactics were no 
longer a specialized selling feature (although it should be mentioned that the Swiss continued to 
provide mercenary troops to a multitude of countries well into the 19th century) the ascendancy 
of Swiss military units was over. The Swiss cantons would continue to hire out their men into the 
1700s, most noticeably to France,li however, this was much more a case of a state hiring out the 
services of its infantry to another, than direct mercenary work. 
 This national support, on a more tacit level than from a modern nation, allows for 
intervention in conflicts in which a nation has a vested interest while avoiding a direct 
confrontation. Additionally, the more conflict a PMSC is involved in, the more experienced and 
skilled it becomes at waging warfare. Because of this advantage, the profession of mercenary 
kept being sought out by governing bodies. Thus, while the later Swiss foreign military units 
came to resemble the French Foreign Legion or the Nepalese Ghurkhas, the Swiss pike 
companies of the 13th to 16th centuries remained state approved mercenary units.     
German Landsknecht  
 The Swiss case, however, does not necessarily resemble that of other private companies. 
Another example of initially state-backed mercenary forces, the German Landsknecht, did not 
possess the same loyalty to their state but rather fought for whoever paid them. While technically 
under the control, of the German Emperor, they would fight against German forces as well, 
illustrating that state-sponsored mercenary units did not necessarily feel loyalty to their nation of 
origin. 
 The Landsknecht units (literally meaning “foot-soldier” or “land servant”) were formed 
around 1490 by Emperor Maximilian I, who intended them to act as mercenaries, but on the 
condition that they would be willing to answer the Emperor’s call should he ever need them.lii 
The reason for Maximilian’s creation of these units was the Swiss Pike Regiments, currently in 
ascendance on the battlefield. With Germany lacking in the way of regular army and pike-
infantry, Maximilian saw a chance to both create a military and to battle-harden it without having 
to enter direct conflict. However, this is not to say that the Landsknecht were particularly loyal: 
there are multiple accounts of Landsknechts fighting other Landsknechts on the battlefield, each 
company working for a separate employer. For instance, in a particular case, a German knight, 
Georg von Frundsberg, led a 10,000 man strong army of Landsknecht on campaign against Italy. 
However, the army soon found itself fighting opposing forces with contingents of Landsknechts 
working for them.liii Also, the Landsknechts were not particularly honorable individuals, they 
had a tendency for looting and a willingness to become violent if they felt cheated from their 
rightful pay. This is shown by the 1527 sack of Rome during which Landsknechts (led by the 
same Georg von Frundsberg) ran rampant in the city for nine months until they were paid their 
delayed wages.liv     
 In terms of specialization, the German mercenaries possessed Zweihänder, two-hander 
great swords, massive weapons that averaged four and a half feet in length. Used by the skilled 
doppelsoldners, or double-pay soldiers, these fearsome weapons would disrupt the Swiss in a 
pike battle and force the `push-of-pike’ combat into the Landsknechts’ favour. While the 
Landsknechts were primarily pikemen, they were willing to adapt do the changes of warfare, and 
diversified into use of artillery and firearms, allowing them to hold dominance with their defeat 
of the Swiss at Biocca in 1522.lv This adaptation would see the German Landsknecht still in 
existence in the time of the Thirty Years War.lvi 
Condottieri: The Contractors  
 A further example of detachment from specific governmental control, the Italian 
Condottieri exemplify the development of truly business-minded warfare, as they were willing to 
fight for any patron who would pay for their services. They also operated with an 
accompaniment of scribes, lawyers and notaries, drawing up contracts with explicit stipulations 
and specific numbers of troops to be raised. It is from this extremely systemized approach to 
conducting war that the PMSCs can most strongly trace their lineage, in which contracting 
warfare is a purely business-like affair.  
 Mercenaries were not new to the Italian city states by the 14th century. A series of 
invasions of Italy had resulted in German, Flemish, Brabantine and Hungarian mercenary bands 
appearing in the country.lvii These conflicts simply augmented the number of available private 
soldiers, as the English had also entered the scene by the early 13th century, and some of the 
famous companies still existed, albeit with new individuals.lviii  
 The Condottieri were recorded as treating the profession of arms as strictly business, with 
no loyalty guaranteed once a contract was fulfilled. Carefully-drafted documents stipulated the 
terms of service, number of men, and salary within the terms of the contract.lix In some cases the 
contract would stipulate a grace period, after the task’s completion, in which the hired 
mercenaries could not wage war on their previous employer.lx  The Condottieri employed a 
number of non-military personnel in order to maintain their business, including ``treasurers, 
bankers, attorneys, secretaries, notaries and registrars”.lxi These mercenary companies were also 
notable for what, in The Prince, Niccolò Machiavelli described as “slow, belated, unconvincing 
victories, and then sudden, bewildering defeats”.lxii  In this, Machiavelli seems to be referring to 
the reduction of slaughter on the battlefield when Condottieri companies fought each other. It is 
recognized that the mercenary leaders would seek to defeat, but not entirely crush their rivals, 
lest they lose a potential patron for employment opportunities.lxiii Alternatively, he could simply 
be referring to the “push-of-pike” method of combat, as he speaks in turn of John Hawkwood, a 
leader of an English mercenary company called the White Company.lxiv Pike combat would 
looked much like a gradual back and forth grind, with one side finally turning and fleeing, 
something which would have occurred quite quickly after a long duration of seemingly standing 
still. Hawkwood`s White Company fought effectively in the style of Swiss pike regiments, with 
densely packed columns of men slowly advancing on foot with lances lowered.lxv Hawkwood 
himself achieved quite a high status in Italy, owning multiple estates.lxvi He is an example of the 
range of nationalities that found work as mercenaries in Italy in the 14th to 16th centuries.  
 Mercenary companies would hold a monopoly on warfare inside Italy,lxvii and would in 
fact seize political control from their employers.lxviii The so called “Grand Company” under the 
command of Walter of Montreal, numbering some 7,000 men, marched from city to city 
demanding tribute.lxix The Condottieri mercenary companies in Italy were willing to fight for 
money, but would not decimate an opponent if they had the chance. However, this unwillingness 
to press the advantage for decisive victory was not the result of a merciful attitude, but rather of a 
farsighted view of potential employment by their opponent, something which does not nurture 
loyal soldiers, but hands victory to whoever has the largest amount of wealth to spend. 
 This method of conducting war would change as nations begin to look within their own 
citizens to raise their armies, rather than seeking external manpower. This would temporarily end 
the dominance of mercenaries on the battlefield, and bring about a much more standardized 
soldier who fought for a single national flag. 
The Decline of Mercenary Participation and Rise of the Conditioned Soldier 
 This section will discuss the gradual decline of the mercenary as an actor on the 
battlefield, as the development of national armies absorbed the majority of independent soldiers 
into its ranks. One of the key reasons for this decline was the simplification of warfare, requiring 
less specialization and transforming the soldier into a mechanical operator rather than an 
independent combatant. An example of this reduction in specialization will be illustrated through 
the recruitment and training of the Prussian infantryman in the 18th century.  
 While “mercenaries” were utilized after the 1700s, they were much more closely linked 
to their respective states than were the Condottieri or Landsknechts. The development of national 
consciousness and a wish to maintain neutrality in conflicts can be argued to be one of the 
reasons why military units eventually stopped being sold to other countries. However, the 
independent mercenary bands seem to disappear closer to the 1700s rather than the 1850s.lxx For 
instance, the British hired some 30,000 German soldiers to augment their own military in 
America during the War of Independence in 1775. These men were hired from some of the 
poorer provinces, such as Hesse-Kassel, which caused the Germans who served overseas to be 
labelled with the generic name of “Hessians”.lxxi While these individuals were indeed nationally 
unrelated to the conflict, and the German states were simply selling their forces to the British, the 
German soldiers themselves were not exactly mercenaries. That is to say, they did not seek 
employ with the British and merely functioned under the orders of their provincial nobility, who 
were paid a fee to supply such troops. Furthermore, Hesse-Kassel also supplied its troops to the 
Netherlands, Venice, and England.lxxii  Many countries developed distinct “foreign legions” 
within their military structure, some which exist to this day, such as the French Foreign Legion 
in the French army and the Nepalese Ghurkha units in both the Indian and British armies. 
Despite the fact that these units can include foreign individuals, in the case of the French Foreign 
Legion, members must swear allegiance to France. Similarly, in the case of the Ghurkhas, 
combatants are considered a part of the British military in all respects and therefore find 
themselves under British military laws and regulations.  
 The end result is that mercenaries in this time simply function in the uniform of the state 
they are utilized by, or in the uniform of the army they were contracted from, making them 
auxiliaries to an army rather than short-term mercenary forces. 
Prussia`s Machine Men: The Prussian Infantryman  
A perfect example of this shift in dynamics is that of Prussia; ``Frederick the Great of 
Prussia wrote that he would not furnish the Crown with mercenaries even if he was offered `all 
the millions possible’” lxxiii This reveals a change in mind-set which favours a long-standing 
army, which would arguably be more loyal to the governing body. Prussia’s military 
development during the 18th century provides an excellent example of a largely conscripted and 
conditioned military, which would have absorbed potential mercenaries into its ranks. This type 
of simplification and standardization created an interregnum of widespread independent 
mercenary involvement in combat.  
 The Prussian army of Frederick William I (1713-1740) and his son Frederick II (1740-
1786), also known as “the Great,” was in large part formed out of a near slave trade form of 
conscription, which utilized “crimping” gangs that would kidnap, or otherwise threaten 
individuals into the army.lxxiv These gangs were not limited to functioning on Prussian soil and 
would actually operate in surrounding principalities as well.lxxv  A second source of recruits for 
many armies of the time was the conscription of criminals. Convicts were often offered the 
option of either facing execution or military service.lxxvi In fact, the Prussian army has been 
called “mercenary” due to its extremely high percentage of foreign soldiers that comprised its 
ranks.lxxvii This however is not accurate, as these soldiers were enlisted (generally for life) in its 
army, fought in the uniform of the Prussian nation, and in many cases had been coerced into 
service. Foreign mercenaries, therefore, found themselves enlisted directly into armies by which 
they would otherwise have been hired on a limited capacity, and they thus served out their 
military careers as soldiers of the state. If they deserted, managed to escape pursuit, avoided 
punishment, and offered their services to another state, they most likely found themselves once 
again enrolled as a soldier in the standing army of that state. 
 The Prussian military provides an excellent example of military developments of the 
time, specifically the decline in autonomy individual infantrymen would have on the battlefield. 
A soldier of the Prussian army could expect a regimen of extremely harsh discipline, utilizing an 
almost universal application of corporal punishment.lxxviii This led to training in a much more 
conditioned sense. After thousands of hours of repetitive drilling, a Prussian solider was 
expected to reflexively load, prime, and aim a rifle so that he could fire it on command.lxxix  Line 
infantry warfare ultimately required the soldier to follow the orders of their officer to the letter, 
with absolutely no free thought as to the effect.  An infantryman in the Prussian military looked 
forward to standing at attention for hours under the continuous barrage of artillery, only to walk 
point-blank into enemy fire before finally being ordered to return fire. At this time, muskets were 
not accurate, and a Prussian experiment, conducted towards the end of the 18th century, 
concluded that at 75 yards only 60 percent of shots would hit their intended target.lxxx 
The end result made standardization and simplification key to victory; an average, 
almost-robotic soldier was to be directly maneuvered and commanded by highly trained and 
equally standardized officer corps.lxxxi This removed any market for specialization, and made 
recruitment a simple demand for raw bodies. Casualties in 18th century combat are estimated to 
have equalled any combat seen in previous centuries of warfare—the Prussian army lost 180,000 
men during the Seven Years War of 1756-63.lxxxii Frederick the Great explains this new-found 
approach to war in the most colourful and accurate way: ``If my solders were to begin to think, 
not one of them would remain in the army.” lxxxiii 
Dynamic Shift: Warfare is Continuing to Become Asymmetrical 
 The gradual shift of warfare, from being highly systemized and ritualized on the 
battlefield to requiring more independence and self-initiative, provided a market once again for 
mercenaries and a short-cut for nations to access specialized actors without the expenditure of 
time and training needed to create their own. Companies such as Executive Outcomes in the 
1990’s re-established the mercenary tradition by providing specialized forces to nations that did 
not possess enough soldiers of their own, if any at all. 
 As conflicts continue to become more and more asymmetrical (one force is either 
numerically and/or technologically inferior, and has to resort to unconventional tactics and/or 
equipment) and the development of more and more advanced tactics, and implementation of 
firearms, the expectations for combat infantry likewise shift. The infantry is no longer expected 
to stand in a straight line to load, prime, aim, and fire a rifle regardless of both musket and 
cannonball crashing into their lines, nor are they expected to go ``over the top`` and march 
headlong into machinegun fire as they were on  battlefields as Ypres and the Somme in the First 
World War. The battlefields themselves have changed, and now include almost every geological 
feature on Earth. Furthermore, battles no longer take place in removed fields or woods; they 
occur throughout cities and towns populated by civilians. Armies have become much smaller 
than they were at the start of the 20th century.lxxxiv This is simply a matter of economics and cost-
efficiency: no country can expect to equip massive armies with modern weapons, equipment, and 
protection without directly mobilizing its economy and putting it on a war footing.lxxxv In 
addition, maintaining a constant state of war can potentially reflect poorly on the nation 
maintaining it. On the international stage, they would appear conflict-oriented and risk censure 
by other nations, not to mention the fact that they would need to appeal to their own population 
to justify the high cost of maintaining their stance.  
Mercenaries provide a quick augmentation of already standing forces, as they are already 
trained and often combat-experienced, offering short-term additional numbers for conflict.    
Military Actors without Uniform 
 Warfare now features heavily the irregular combatant, who has no distinctive armaments 
or uniform. They are essentially armed civilians (with or without military experience), with ad-
hoc units and informal ranks. This type of warfare became more and more popular with conflicts 
from the 1950s onwards, with the initial fragmentation of the Soviet Union, the wars in Africa 
and the CIA-backed wars of Central and South America. What was originally known as “rural 
guerrilla warfare” has moved on to “urban guerilla warfare”, high profile and target attacks 
which are essentially methods to denigrate government authority.lxxxvi Modern day insurgents, in 
multiple situations throughout the world, do not operate on a specific uniform, nor do they 
function continuously as combat units, but may or may not actively integrate themselves in with 
non-combatant populations.  A modern infantryman is expected to think on their feet now, and 
assess all potential threats in order to maximize their reaction times. There is a requirement for 
individuals now to work together in small teams, without military operations on the scales 
previously seen in the First and Second World Wars.  
 The mercenary profession seemed to suddenly reappear in conflicts with the Congo Crisis 
of the 1960s. The mercenaries were from a multitude of nations, and were from  very diverse 
backgrounds, including veterans of the Second World War and naïve individuals with illusions 
of adventure. Mike Hoare, a mercenary leader in the Congo conflict, recruited his soldiers 
through newspaper classified ads.lxxxvii The actions of the mercenaries in the Congo conflict are 
very murky, and exactly all the activities they were up to is still questioned. However, mercenary 
units are recorded working in concert with Belgian and American forces. The Congo mercenaries 
simply added to the chaos of the Congo Crisis and seemed to muddle events further. 
Executive Outcomes 
 Executive Outcomes was a South African based PMSC, which set the framework for 
companies after it brought to the market specialization for clients in conflict resolution. Like the 
Free Companies of the 13th century, this PMSC was created as a result of downsizing of the 
military. Many of them were veterans of South African Defense Force (SADF), and had combat 
experience. This military career led to them marketing their specializations, and their success in 
Sierra Leone proved that a small military unit could defeat an enemy force many times larger if 
proper equipped and trained.  
The actions of Executive Outcomes (EO) PMSC in Angola and Sierra Leone during the 
1990s were that of an independent mercenary force hired to actively assault and destroy elements 
of the rebel forces. Executive Outcomes, along with Sandline, was one of the first corporations 
(that is to say a legally existing business entity) to strictly market combat ready forces for 
offensive work.lxxxviii They acted similarly to the American military during the Vietnam War, 
conducting seek and destroy missions through helicopter insertion of infantry. The firm spent 
roughly 21 months in Sierra Leone,lxxxix during which it suffered less than 20 casualties,xc out of 
a total of approximately 250 individuals, actively engaging a force of an estimated 15,000 
individuals (Shadow Company). Through its efforts, a peace accord was signed November 
1996.xci  
 The majority of Executive Outcomes was comprised of former South African Defence 
Force (SADF) personnel, who were downsized following the end of apartheid.xcii A large chunk 
of these men had fought in multiple conflicts, and many of them actually came from South 
Africa`s special forces, which was especially hated by the South African revolutionaries (ANC). 
Some elements of these units, such as the Koevoet, a police counterinsurgency group, were 
known to have committed atrocities such as torture and killing of prisoners.xciii   
This downsize is in some ways reminiscent of the English free companies that formed 
during the Hundred Years War, as they had nothing else to turn to except seeking further 
employment in warfare. An estimate of the total number of soldiers dismissed from the SADF is 
60,000; generating a very large potential employment pool for EO.xciv The pay offered to 
individuals monthly ranged from 2,000 to 13,000 USD (United States Dollars) based on 
experience, and was roughly 3,500 dollars for soldiers, 4,000 for officers, and 7,500 for aircrews, 
roughly 5 times the South African military equivalent.xcv  They brought with them a level of 
specialization that was valuable on the market, and in succeeding to such a large degree were 
able to prove the strategic, if not the moral, value of utilizing mercenaries as an alternative to 
standing militaries. While the origins of many of EO`s employees made for some tension, as they 
were veterans of a military that had actively attempted to crush the forerunners of the current 
government, it has been argued that South Africa made use of EO’s formation to forward its own 
interests, ``pushing`` even for EO to take on certain contracts in a number of African 
countries.xcvi   
PMCS: Modern Condottieri on a Global Scale     
 PMSCs, like their Condottieri forbearers, construct their forces around the needs of the 
contracts they acquire. They are comprised of combat veterans from multiple nations, and 
provide specialized combat skills. 
 If Executive Outcomes and the mercenaries of African in the 1960s were the Free 
Companies of Europe, the Private Military Companies(PMC) and Private Security 
Companies(PSC) of the 2001 private contractor boomxcvii were the Condottieri in corporate 
structure and contracting methods. While PMC companies did exist in a much smaller manner 
previous to September 11, 2001, they were already expected to continue in expansion. xcviii The 
attacks on the World Trade Center were akin to adding gunpowder to a jerry can and lighting a 
match.  The private military sector overnight turned from seeing a slow and steady increase in 
business to becoming a thriving enterprise with multiple contracts, as the United States looked 
for advisors to upgrade, train, and augment its military forces in the conflicts to come. ``In Iraq, 
the US Government Accountability Office (GOA 2006) estimated between 20,000 and 50,000 
former military personnel have been employed by PMCs supplying various military services to 
coalition state agencies and US based companies working on Iraq reconstruction projects``.xcix 
 Like the Condottieri of ages past, the PMCs build forces around the needs of their 
contracts, and do not have a static force always on hand. Rather, they collect their forces and 
then bring them to the employer. Similarly, this can be seen through surviving Condottieri 
contracts, in which different conditions and even negotiations can be observed.c In the case of 
PMSCs, the exact nature of contracts is much murkier. For the United States of America, a major 
employer of PMSCs, the Defense Department has seen accusations of fraud and lack of 
transparency with respect to its contract spending.ci  
 However, the supply of specialized troops for specific contracts remains the same, with 
the companies themselves remaining static and their ``employees,” more often than not, 
functioning on much more of a contract basis (personal interview). This allows for the company 
to keep a dynamic and expanding roster, and for individuals themselves to go and seek further 
certification in other specialized forms of both combat and security proficiencies. This includes, 
but is not limited to: proficiency in foreign weapons(usually specifies the weapon model), firing 
from moving and static vehicles, firing while exiting vehicle, entering buildings, exiting 
buildings, securing rooms in hostile environments, operating static machine guns, handgun 
proficiency, explosive proficiency, ability to disarm bombs, and scarily enough,  security 
clearance levels of United States Department of Defence. The last one is required by many 
different jobs in order to apply for them (pulled from triple canopy and academic websites). 
 Former Special Forces members are highly sought out, including Navy SEALs, Delta 
Force, Green Berets, British SAS, Irish Rangers, Australian SAS, Nepalese Ghurkhas, and 
Serbian Commandos.cii One estimate stated there were more ex-SAS than active duty members 
inside Iraq in 2004.ciii With offerings of very high pay compared to the salary of most special 
forces operators, with comparable or even lower risk, it is no wonder these individuals are 
willing to work for these companies, in some cases even resigning from the military in order to 
do so(interview). 
 In many cases the weaponry and equipment needed is supplied by the contracting 
company for the individual contractor, with the allowance that they may bring whatever gear 
they prefer should they choose to.civ This provides PMCs the ability to use whatever equipment 
they would prefer. While the base uniform may be determined by the company itself the rest is 
up to the individual, arguably giving them the advantage of the best tools for the job. This, of 
course, is not always the norm, as some cases have shown individuals turning up with equipment 
that is absolutely sub-standard. In addition, the availability of weaponry inside countries in 
which the mercenaries operate may not be adequate (interview, Shadow Company). 
 Another reason put forward for the increase in PMCs is the cost. The same figures have 
been debated as both positive and negative; a Blackwater operative in 2007 cost 1,222 per day, a 
sergeant in the military cost between 50,000 and 70,000 per year.cv The argument, however, does 
not take into account that mercenaries are utilized as contract-based individuals, and if hired for 
only short periods of time reduce the cost of the military significantly, especially if those hired 
have extensive military background and therefore have all of the training normally expected of 
an armed forces member. 
Findings 
Demilitarization Provides Recruits 
 What Executive Outcomes demonstrated on the military market was that quality could 
once again defeat quantity and that with the military downsizing that was increasing after the end 
of the cold war, a market was opening up for these soldiers to work on-demand in a multitude of 
countries that  could not, or would not, provide their own military force. The “phenomenon”` of 
the mercenary boom can be tied in part to global military downsizing from 6,873,000 (1990) to 
3,283,000 (1997).cvi  This giant downsize can be seen quite logically as placing a large number of 
individuals with military training on the market for recruitment by private military companies,cvii 
as well as opening the door in some cases to careers in criminal activities. ‘Private Intelligence’ 
in Eastern Europe, for example, commonly refers to former State Security personnel working 
closely with Crime Syndicates.cviii A simple search into the origins of Los Zetas Cartel in Mexico 
shows that they began in a military unit going mercenary for the very elements they were 
originally tasked to destroy, in almost Heart-of-Darkness-style villainy. While only alleged, 
Mexican and Columbian cartels are rumored to hire any former special forces members willing 
to work with them on instructing their soldiers on tactics,cix weapons handling and proper firing 
drills (with the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel ranked 701 on the list of world’s richest people in the 
world, it would not be considered a stretch). cx  
 In discussions with PMCs, the author has also heard in passing the ``dark side”` of 
mercenary work. That is to say individuals leaving the military for whatever reason and being 
immediately approached by criminal elements and recruited either with offers of cash or with 
threats of violence. Some of the criminal elements named were the Mexican Drug Cartels, the 
Russian mafia and more locally, criminal motorcycle gangs (interview).   
 All of this, however, is not a new phenomenon as shown by the Landsknechts and Free 
Companies, as well as the Greek mercenaries to a lesser degree, who when not fighting for an 
employer, would regularly turn to robbery, looting and general brigandage. While the modus 
operandi may have changed, the essence of the actions remains much the same 
Quality over Quantity 
“There is such a thing as a ‘natural soldier’: the kind of man who derives his greatest 
satisfaction from male companionship, from excitement, and from the conquering of 
physical and psychological obstacles. He doesn’t necessarily want to kill people as such, 
but he will have no objections if it occurs within a moral framework that gives him a 
justification—like war—and if it is the price of gaining admission to the kind of 
environment he craves. Whether such men are born or made, I do not know, but most of 
them end up in armies (and many more move on again to become mercenaries, because 
regular army life in peacetime is too routine and boring.)” Dyer, War.  
 The resurgence of private actors in warfare, conducting combat actions on the behalf of 
an employer, coincides with the development of warfare that requires specialized actors who can 
conduct warfare independently. Asymmetrical warfare demands free thinking operators who are 
able to function without continuous orders from their higher ups. Furthermore, with the 
demobilization of military and the increasing budgets of these companies as they receive more 
and more lucrative contracts, PMSCs have prime choice with respect to who they hire, and are 
able to look for the most skilled and experienced individuals to contract. Furthermore, the 
industry is one that has the ability to lure individuals from the military after they have received 
their basic training, offering a substantial increase in pay to those willing to join.cxi 
 Like the English Longbow man and the Swiss pikeman, actors in modern conflict must 
be specialized, and private enterprises offering such services have flourished when they are in 
demand and willing to adapt to the needs of their employer. Current PMSCs are adapting as well; 
a British company called Air Partner is now offering a “global evacuation service” to 
multinational corporate employees in the event of crisis. As this degree of specialization and 
diversification occurs, so too does the centralization of violence. The mercenary trade is not a 
product of the 20th or 21st century, and the PMSC industry is populated by individuals who 
arguably, in another century, upon being downsized, would have found themselves joining a free 
company or a landsknecht regiment, and posed the same possible negative ramifications of 
freedom of force 
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